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FROM GEBHARD TO CARPENTER: TOWARDS A (NON-)ECONOMIC
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION
ELEANOR SPAVENTA*
1. Introduction
The free movement provisions have always been generously construed by the
European Court of Justice. Through a teleological rather than a literal inter-
pretation, the Court ensured that individuals would enjoy tangible benefits
from their State’s membership of the Community. Further, the Court has
adopted a dynamic interpretation, reflecting both the evolving nature of the
Community integration process, and changes in society.
If, following Keck, the scope of the free movement of goods has been (at
least partially) curtailed, the scope of the free movement of persons provi-
sions has been considerably broadened. The step towards a non-discrimina-
tory assessment of the workers and establishment provisions, together with
some developments which have occurred in the field of services, have made
it considerably easier for individuals (and companies) to bring themselves
within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty. Consequently, an increasing
number of rules are subject to the necessity and proportionality assessment
demanded by the imperative requirements doctrine. This creates three main
problems. First of all, it is debated whether such intrusion into the regulatory
autonomy of the Member States is justified by the Treaty. Secondly, it is in-
creasingly difficult to assess the boundaries of the free movement provisions.
Thirdly, the practical difficulty in drawing a demarcation line between rules
which can be construed as obstacles to the exercise of the movement rights,
and rules which should fall altogether outside the scope of the Treaty, is re-
flected in the difficulty of providing a satisfactory conceptual framework ca-
pable of defining the scope of the Treaty rights whilst also accommodating
the developments of the often confused case law.
* This is an elaborated version of a paper presented in November 2002 at a lunch-time
seminar organized by the Cambridge Centre for European Legal Studies. I am grateful to
Michael Dougan, Professor Derrick Wyatt, and Catherine Barnard for their comments. The
usual disclaimer applies.
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This article aims at exploring these problems by focusing on the case law
on non-discriminatory restrictions in the field of free movement of persons.
It will be argued that whilst the discrimination/double burden approach does
not reflect the State of the law, the market access theory either cannot ex-
plain the post-Gebhard case law, or, if it can, it does not provide us with any
indication as to the content of the free movement provisions. It will then be
suggested that the internal market rationale does not provide a valid explana-
tion for some of the Court’s case law. Rather, the rulings in Gebhard, Gour-
met and Carpenter are part of a broader phenomenon, where the Court is
protecting the citizen qua citizen, rather than simply qua mover, thereby as-
suming a role which traditionally pertained to national constitutional courts.
Thus, it will be argued, these cases should be seen in the context of the intro-
duction, and development, of Union citizenship.
We will start by outlining the different conceptual frameworks elaborated
in relation to the free movement provisions, to then turn our attention to the
case law to assess how the theory relates to the practice, and to suggest a
new framework of analysis.
2. Different conceptual frameworks: An outline
Three main theories have been put forward in relation to the scope of the free
movement provisions: the discrimination theory, the double burden theory
and the market access theory.
Those who support the discrimination theory argue that the Treaty is con-
cerned only with the elimination of protectionism and with ensuring that for-
eign goods and persons be treated, substantially and formally, in the same
way as domestic goods and nationals.1 Provided there is no discrimination,
there is no infringement of Community rights, and the courts should refrain
from judicial scrutiny under Community law. The scrutiny of non-discrimi-
natory rules under the Treaty free movement provisions implies a choice
about the appropriate level of regulation which, it is argued, is not justified
by the Treaty. In the absence of harmonization such choices are reserved to
the Member States, since the Treaty does not provide any indication as to a
preferred type of market economy. Those who support a discriminatory ap-
proach to the Treaty free movement provisions usually accept that their view
is prescriptive rather than descriptive. In other words, they accept that a dis-
criminatory approach does not explain all of the case law of the Court.
1. See e.g. Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law (OUP, 2002).
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Rather, they argue that a discriminatory approach is the only approach which
is consistent with the Treaty, and that those cases which cannot be so ex-
plained were wrongly decided.
The double burden theory might be seen as a more refined version of the
discrimination theory. According to this theory, the internal market requires
not only the abolition of discrimination but also that, even lacking harmoni-
zation, only one set of rules should apply to those covered by the free move-
ment provisions. This theory was first elaborated to conceptualize the mutual
recognition principle established in Cassis,2 and provides us with a satisfac-
tory explanation of the rationale behind it. The idea is that any given product
should be regulated only once, since to do otherwise would mean to impose
a double burden on imported products which would have to satisfy both the
regulatory standards of the Member State of origin and those of the Member
State of destination. The double burden is borne only by those products
which move, and in this way the imposition of additional regulatory stan-
dards directly impacts on the freedom granted by the Treaty. The mutual rec-
ognition principle therefore ensures a substantial rather than just a formal
notion of free movement. Bernard has argued that this theory provides a suit-
able explanation for the Keck case law.3 In his view, the selling arrange-
ments/product requirements dichotomy is entirely consistent with the double
burden theory: the way the product is sold is regulated only by the place of
sale, whilst the way the product is produced is regulated only by the Member
State of origin. Should a Member State wish to impose additional rules, thus
creating a double burden, it has to justify them according to the mandatory
requirements doctrine.4
The double burden theory is entirely consistent with the internal market
rationale. Once a product has been lawfully produced it should be able to
move freely around the Community: a market without frontiers so requires.
The deregulatory effect that might result from negative integration is then
2. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (“Cassis
de Dijon”), [1979] ECR 649.
3. Joined Cases C-267/91 & C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097. Bernard,
“La libre circulation des marchandises, des personnes et des services dans le Traité CE sous
l’angle de la compétence”, 33 CDE (1998), 11; and id., Multilevel Governance in the European
Union (Kluwer Law International, 2002), esp. ch. 2.
4. However, it should be borne in mind that the dichotomy selling arrangements/product
requirements does not exhaust the type of rules which might be caught by Art. 28. If it is true
that in most of the cases which concern rules different from product requirements/selling ar-
rangements the rule under scrutiny either imposed a barrier to movement or it was discrimina-
tory, that was not true in Case C-189/95, H Franzén, [1997] ECR I-5909, where a licence
requirement was held to be caught by Art. 28 regardless of whether discrimination was in-
volved.
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purely incidental, and judicial scrutiny is not concerned with the appropriate
level of regulation, but with ensuring that no product should be asked to sat-
isfy more than one set of rules. Thus the internal market, as far as negative
integration is concerned, requires that there should be no discrimination, no
frontier obstacle and no double regulatory burden.
The double burden theory also provides a suitable explanation for the
Court’s case law on free movement of persons before 1991,5 i.e. before the
step towards a non-discriminatory assessment of those provisions. Thus in
the case of services, the Member States must take into account the checks
performed by the Member State of establishment.6 In the case of workers
and establishment, however, there is usually no issue of double burden be-
cause the person, by establishing herself in another Member State, ceases
(for most purposes) to be regulated by the Member State of origin. Consis-
tently, the Court’s interpretation was limited to an assessment of whether the
rules were indirectly discriminatory. In the case of qualification require-
ments – which have always been considered as barriers falling within the
scope of application of Article 437 – the case law might be seen both as a
consistent application of the princilpe of non-discrimination, and as a consis-
tent application of the double burden theory, in that to ask a person who al-
ready satisfied one set of rules to satisfy another set of rules in order to take
advantage of the Treaty freedom, is tantamount to imposing a double burden
on the migrant. Thus, in this case as well, negative integration might be seen
as concerned only with ensuring the free movement of persons and as not in-
terfering with the appropriate level of regulation. The internal market then
requires that there should be no discriminatory rules, and that economic ac-
tors be able to move around without being penalized for so doing.
The double burden theory overlaps significantly with the discrimination
theory, in that a rule which imposes a double burden is almost inevitably also
indirectly discriminatory since it affects migrants or imported products more
than it affects non-migrants or domestic products. However, the double bur-
5. In Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and Others v.
Comissariaat voor de Media, [1991] ECR I-4007, and Case C-76/90, M Säger v. Dennemeyer
& Co. Ltd, [1991] ECR I-4221, the Court explicitly departed from a discriminatory assessment
of Art. 49. It can be argued that, already in Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (Insurance),
[1986] ECR 3755, the Court had used a non-discriminatory approach to the restrictions under
scrutiny. However, even though the language used in the ruling is consistent with this interpre-
tation, the case concerned a residence and registration requirement, which can be seen (and are
usually seen) as indirectly discriminatory.
6. Consistent case law, e.g. Joined Cases 110 & 111/78, ASBL v. W Van Wesemael and
others, [1979] ECR 35; Case 279/80, Criminal proceedings against A J Webb, [1981] ECR
3305.
7. Consistent case law, e.g. Case 11/77, Patrick v. Minister of Cultural Affairs, [1977] ECR
1199.
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den theory is conceptually more satisfactory than a mere discriminatory
theory since it focuses on the specific effect of the rule on products and mi-
grants, rather than on a comparative assessment between national products/
persons, and foreign products/persons. Thus, for instance, the double burden
theory can be easily applied even when there is no national comparator, i.e.
when there is no domestic production of the goods in question or no national
service provider.8 The two theories are in any event closely linked and indeed
their supporters share the same concern over the fact that the Treaty should
not be construed as a weapon to challenge Member States’ regulatory poli-
cies which do not specifically affect movement.
Lastly, several authors believe the key concept in free movement law to be
market access.9 Thus the internal market requires not only the elimination of
directly and indirectly discriminatory barriers, but also the elimination of
those rules which affect the economic actors’ ability to access the market,
since the reason why we have the free movement provisions in the first place
is that economic operators should be given the opportunity to exercise their
economic activity. We shall analyse the market access theory in detail in the
course of this article, since this is the only theory which might be able also to
accommodate the developments which have occurred in the case law.
3. Climbing the ladder: Towards a new layer of fundamental rights
   protection
3.1. The first step: The Gebhard (r)evolution
In the previous section, I pointed out that the double burden theory provides
a suitable explanation for the Court’s case law on the free movement of per-
sons before 1991. In the 1990s, the Court progressively expands its interpre-
8. In its assessment of the discriminatory effect of internal taxation under Art. 90, the Court
has expressly held that the lack of domestic production of the same or similar goods excludes
the possibility of discrimination, Case 47/88, Commission v. Denmark (Registration duty for
cars), [1990] ECR I-4509; upheld in Case C-383/01, De Danske Bilimportører v. Skatteminis-
teriet, Told- og Skattestyrelsen, [2003] ECR I-6065; for a requirement that the situation be
comparable before a finding of discrimination can be made, see Joined Cases C-430 & 431/99,
Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Douane, Rotterdam district v. Sea-Land Service Inc and
Nedlloyd Lijnen BV, [2002] ECR I-5235, para 36.
9. See e.g. A.G. Jacobs’ Opinion in Case C-412/93, Société d’importation Éduard Leclerc-
Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA, [1995] ECR I-179; Weatherill, “After Keck: some thoughts on how
to clarify the clarification” 33 CML Rev. (1996), 885; Barnard, “Fitting the remaining pieces
into the goods and persons jigsaw?” 26 EL Rev. (2001), 35; Poiares Maduro, “Harmony and
Dissonance in Free Movement” in Andenas and Roth (Eds.), Services and Free Movement in
EU Law (OUP, 2002), p. 41.
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tation of the persons provisions by explicitly including non-discriminatory
restrictions first within the scope of Article 49,10 and then within the scope
of Articles 39 and 43.11 The expansion of the scope of Article 49 is not in
itself particularly problematic. The provision of cross-border services bears,
in fact, considerable resemblance to the free movement of goods. The service
provider moves, if at all, to the host Member State only temporarily; in so
doing, she does not cease to be regulated by the Member State of establish-
ment. Thus, the imposition of the rules of the host State means that the pro-
vider might be subject to a double regulatory burden, having to satisfy both
the rules imposed by the Member State of establishment and those of the
State of destination.12 The situation is however different in relation to Ar-
ticles 39 and 43.13 This is because in the case of workers/establishment the
migrant usually establishes herself in the host country.14 By so doing, the
person ceases, for most purposes, to be regulated by her country of origin.
Thus, there is usually no issue of a double regulatory burden. When people
establishing themselves in another country could question only directly and
indirectly discriminatory rules, the double burden theory, with its stress on
the inherent division of regulatory competences, provided an accurate expla-
nation of the rationale behind the Court’s interpretation. As a matter of prin-
ciple, an established person would be subject to all (non-discriminatory)
rules of the host-State, since those would be the only rules to which she
would be subject and would therefore not impose any double regulatory bur-
den on the migrant. In Gebhard,15 however, the Court departed from its pre-
vious case law and accepted that non-discriminatory rules could also be
construed as obstacles to the freedom of establishment.16
Mr Gebhard was a German lawyer working in Italy; he used the title
avvocato without having previously enrolled at the local bar as required by
Italian law. When other lawyers complained about the improper use of the
10. Gouda and Säger, both cited supra note 5.
11. Cf. Case C-19/92, D Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR I-1663; Case C-
55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, [1995] ECR
I-4165; Case C-415/93, Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-
Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921.
12. Cf. Case C-379/92, Peralta, [1994] ECR I-3453 in which the Court relied on a double
burden type of reasoning to exclude the applicability of Art. 49 to the rules imposed by the
Member State of establishment to its providers.
13. Cf. also Daniele, “Non-discriminatory restrictions to the free movement of persons”, 22
EL Rev. (1997), 191.
14. Of course with the exception of frontier workers.
15. Cited supra note 11.
16. The Court had already indicated its willingness to do so in Kraus, cited supra note 11;
however, in that case the rules did put those who took advantage of their free movement rights
at a disadvantage.
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title, Mr Gebhard argued that the Italian rule was incompatible with Article
43 and/or 49. Having instructed the national court as to the criteria to assess
whether a person is established in a Member State, or rather just providing
services there, the Court went on to analyse the compatibility of the enrol-
ment requirement with Community law. It is important to stress that, for the
purposes of the case, there was no issue of mutual recognition of qualifica-
tions. The issue was not whether Italy had a duty to recognize experience and
qualifications acquired elsewhere. Rather, it was whether Italy could impose
a formal requirement for the exercise of a profession (registration at the local
bar in order to use the title avvocato) on a foreigner who was taking advan-
tage of his freedom of establishment under Article 43. The rule was non-dis-
criminatory since it applied in exactly the same way to Italian citizens
wishing to use the title avvocato, and did not impose any specific burden on
foreigners willing to exercise their profession in Italy. Indeed, if Germany
had had identical rules (which was in fact the case), Mr Gebhard’s situation
would have been exactly the same. In the words of Advocate General
Tesauro, the alleged barrier in this case arose not from different regulatory
standards, but from the very existence of regulatory standards.17 This not-
withstanding, the Court found that the rules at issue fell within the scope of
the Treaty, since the free movement provisions encompass any “rule liable to
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaran-
teed by the Treaty”.18
The broad and unqualified Gebhard formula leaves us in the dark as to the
reason why rules which do not have an impact on the economic actors’ abil-
ity to move should fall within the scope of the Treaty. By allowing Mr
Gebhard to question those rules, thereby requiring that a necessity and pro-
portionality assessment be carried out, the Court severs the link between the
need to achieve an internal market, a market without “frontiers” in which
persons and goods can move freely, and the rules at issue. The lack of speci-
ficity of the intra-Community situation, together with the lack of any qualifi-
cation to the test, suggest that almost any rule could be construed as falling
within the scope of the Treaty.
17. Cf. Opinion in Case C-292/92, Hünermund and Others v. Landesapothekerkammer
Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR I-6787; also White, “In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of
the EEC Treaty”, 26 CML Rev. (1989), 235.
18. Operative part of the ruling. The fact that the Court accepts that in principle non-dis-
criminatory rules regulating an economic activity can be imposed on persons established
within the territory, together with the fact that those rules are generally found to be justified
being subject to a “light” proportionality assessment, does not make this step any less signifi-
cant. What is determinant for our purposes, is that the Court brings these rules within the ambit
of application of the Treaty thus accepting to scrutinize their aim and proportionality.
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The Gebhard interpretation has been confirmed in later cases, and given
that the ruling therein was delivered by the full Court, this is hardly surpris-
ing. In Mac Quen,19 a rule which reserved eye examinations to qualified
ophthalmologists was found to fall within the scope of application of Article
43. As in Gebhard, the issue was not one of mutual recognition of qualifica-
tions, but rather whether a Member State could subject the exercise of a pro-
fession to a qualification requirement. Consistently with Gebhard, the Court
found that such a requirement had to be justified. In Gräbner,20 the same
reasoning applied to an Austrian rule which prevented people not holding a
degree in medicine from practicing as Heilpraktikers (lay health practitio-
ners). In Payroll,21 the claimants attacked Italian legislation reserving the
calculation and printing of payslips for undertakings with less than 250 em-
ployees to centres for data elaboration constituted and composed exclusively
by people registered as labour consultants, lawyers, professional accountants,
and other regulated professions. Once again, the Court confirmed the
Gebhard ruling and found that, even though aimed at the protection of em-
ployees, the Italian legislation was not necessary and thus it was inconsistent
with the freedom of establishment.
It is clear that the rules at issue in those cases would have been considered
as restricting the freedom to provide services if applied to a service provider
established in another Member State. However, what was at issue in these
cases was the States’ power to impose such rules on established persons, i.e.
persons over which the State, being the main if not only regulator, should
have had full regulatory competence. For these reasons, the developments in
Gebhard represent not only a step towards a considerable expansion of the
scope of the free movement provisions, but also a qualitative leap in the con-
tent of the free movement rights. Thus, if previously the Court’s interpreta-
tion of the persons provisions was instrumental – or could be so explained
and justified – to the achievement of the internal market, the move towards a
non-discriminatory assessment adds a new dimension to the rights conferred
upon individuals by the Community. After the developments in Gebhard it is
possible – at least to a certain extent – to attack rules which merely regulate
19. Case C-108/96, D Mac Quen et al v. Grandivision Belgium SA, [2001] ECR I-837.
20. Case C-294/00, Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfaharen GmbH v. K
Gräbner, [2002] ECR I-6515.
21. Case C-79/01, Payroll Data Services (Italy) et al, [2002] ECR I-8923. I am not includ-
ing Case C-255/97, Pfeiffer Großhandel GmbH v. Löwa Warenhandel GmbH, [1999] ECR I-
2835 in the cases decided according to the Gebhard rationale, since the Court, in its rather
confused reasoning, relies on the fact that the rule at issue – an order restraining an undertaking
from using a given name already used by another trader – operated to the detriment of compa-
nies having their seats in other Member States thus suggesting some discriminatory effect.
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an economic activity, even when there seems to be no intra-Community
specificity. Furthermore the same approach has been adopted in the case of
free movement of capital.22 Thus, for instance, rules concerning “golden
shares”, shares held by the Government which carry special powers (usually
in privatized industries), have been held to infringe the freedom of move-
ment of capital.23 Some of the rules struck down by the Court, such as the
limit to ownership in the BAA case, did not have a specific effect on intra-
Community movement of capital. And indeed the reasoning of the Court
suggests that the mere existence of special rules might discourage investors
from investing in a company, and thus restrict market access.24
This development begs then the question as to which rules, if any, are ex-
cluded from judicial scrutiny. Attempts to curtail the breadth of the Gebhard
formula have so far failed,25 and, as we shall see below, it is questionable
whether the market access test can provide any coherent framework for this
case law.
The developments which have occurred in the field of Article 43, have
been mirrored in the case law relating to Article 49, where the Court has al-
lowed service providers to challenge rules imposed by their State of estab-
lishment even in cases in which that State is the only regulator, and there is
no specificity of the intra-Community situation. We shall first consider this
case law to then turn to assess whether the market access test is capable of
accommodating these new developments.
3.2. The second step: The Sodemare/Gourmet case law
In Alpine,26 the Court accepted to scrutinize a non-discriminatory rule im-
posed by the Member State of establishment on the grounds that it consti-
tuted a restriction on the provider’s ability to supply its services abroad. The
provisions at stake forbade financial service providers from approaching
prospective clients by phone or in person, when they had not previously
22. Cf. also Commission’s Communication on certain aspects concerning intra-EU invest-
ments, O.J. 1997, C 220/15, esp. point 9.
23. Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal (Golden shares) [2002] ECR I-4732; Case C-
483/99 Commission v. France (Golden shares) [2002] ECR I-4781; Case C-503/99 Commis-
sion v. Belgium (Golden shares) [2002] ECR I-4809; Case C-98/01 Commission v. UK (BAA
golden share) [2003] ECR I-4641.
24. C-98/01, Commission v. UK (BAA), cited supra note 23, esp. para 47.
25. This subject to the doctrine of effect too uncertain and indirect; see Joined Cases C-418/
93 to C-421/93, Semeraro Casa Uno et al. v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco et al, [1996] ECR
I-2975.
26. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141.
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agreed in writing to be contacted (so called “cold-calling”). The prohibition
applied regardless of the domicile of the potential client, i.e. regardless of
whether the potential client was established in the Netherlands or abroad. Al-
pine, a financial service provider established in the Netherlands, attacked the
rules on the ground that they restricted its ability to contact clients in other
Member States. The Court found such rules to constitute a barrier to the in-
tra-Community provision of services, since they directly affected access to
the market in services in other Member States. The rules at stake therefore
needed to be justified in relation to the imperative requirements doctrine. By
doing so, the Court at least partially departed from the home-country prin-
ciple, i.e. the principle according to which the Member State of establish-
ment is at freedom to regulate persons established in its territory as it deems
appropriate, provided of course the rules are non-discriminatory.27
Nonetheless, Bernard has argued that the ruling is consistent with the real-
location of regulatory competences endorsed by the double burden theory.28
Thus, the rules in Alpine concerned the way the service was to be provided in
another Member State and that is allegedly a matter for the recipient Mem-
ber State. For this reason, the Netherlands, as the provider’s State of estab-
lishment, had to justify its rules. Attractive as it is, this interpretation might
not be consistent with the approach so far followed by the Court, since in the
case of services there seems to be a presumption that the host-State is always
required to justify the imposition of its own rules on a foreign service pro-
vider. However, if, as argued by Bernard, the guiding principle underlying Al-
pine is a reallocation of regulatory competences/double burden rationale
according to which the State of origin cannot impose rules concerning the
way the service is to be provided in another Member State, then – consis-
tently with the Keck approach – the State where the service is provided
should be in no need to justify rules relating to the way the service is pro-
vided. Thus, for instance, a Member State would not have to justify the im-
position on foreign providers of non-discriminatory rules on how clients can
be contacted by providers of financial services. Whilst there is no case law
on this specific aspect, it can be doubted that, given the Court’s broad ap-
27. The home-country principle has never been explicitly endorsed by the Court, rather
being a doctrinal rationalization of the case law, stemming from both the case law on Art. 29,
where the Court, by limiting its scrutiny to discriminatory restrictions, has left it to the Member
States to decide the level of regulation to which home-producers are subject, and from the
Court’s references to the fact that goods and services need to be lawfully produced before a
right to free movement can be enjoyed.
28. Bernard, op. cit. supra note 3 (1998), 11, 34–35; and later Snell, op. cit. supra note 1,
pp. 93–94.
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proach, such rules would fall automatically outside the scope of Article 49.
And indeed, the earlier decision in Gouda seems to point to the opposite re-
sult.29 In that case, the Court accepted to scrutinize a rule which imposed a
Sunday ban on the provision of a service (television advertisement), i.e. a
rule which was akin to a Sunday trading ban.
If it can be questioned that the repartition of regulatory competences en-
dorsed by the double burden theory can provide a satisfactory descriptive
framework for the Alpine approach, the ruling can still be explained with a
movement rationale. The rule was extra-territorial in nature, and thus undeni-
ably imposed a direct hindrance to the provider’s ability to supply services
abroad, a hindrance which was not faced by providers established in the host
Member State. Alpine was in fact unable to advertise its financial products
abroad, even though that would have been possible under the rules of the
Member State where the service was to be provided. It can then be argued
that the rules in Alpine still bore an intra-Community specificity capable of
justifying the Court’s scrutiny.
However, subsequent cases relating to home-country rules seem to indi-
cate a much broader construction of the services provisions. In Sodemare,30
the claimant, an Italian subsidiary of a Luxembourg company, attempted to
rely on Article 49 against Italy, the State of secondary establishment, on the
sole ground that it provided services to, inter alia, foreign recipients. The
disputed rule provided that only non-profit making bodies could conclude
contracts with the local health authority in order to obtain repayment for so-
cial insurance services of a health care nature. The company challenged the
rule on the grounds that about 2% of its residents were foreigners, and that
about 10% of the enquiries were received every year from persons resident
in other Member States.31 The Court, having referred to the general principle
according to which a provider might rely on Article 49 when providing a ser-
vice for persons established in another Member State,32 found that in this
case Article 49 could not be relied upon, since the recipients would establish
29. Gouda, cited supra note 5.
30. Case C-70/95, Sodemare SA v. Regione Lombardia, [1997] ECR I-3395.
31. The company challenged the rules also under freedom of establishment; it could be
questioned whether the fact that Sodemare was in principle allowed to rely both on Art. 43 and
on Art. 49 in order to challenge the same rule, is not inconsistent with the residual nature of the
provisions on services provided by Art. 50 EC.
32. Also cases C-18/93, Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v. Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova,
[1994] ECR I-1783; C-379/92, Peralta, [1994] ECR I-3453; C-224/97, Erich Ciola v. Land
Vorarlberg, [1999] ECR 2517; in Alpine Investments, cited supra note 26, the Court stated that
in order to be able to rely on Art. 49 there is no need of “the prior existence of an identifiable
recipient” (para 19).
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their residence in Italy. Thus the situation, from a services viewpoint, was
wholly internal. However, the Court failed to curtail or specify the extent to
which an established provider may rely on the Treaty just because its recipi-
ent might be foreign.33 In other words, is the potentiality of a foreign recipi-
ent enough to bring the situation within the scope of the Treaty and
challenge the rules of the Member State which might well be the only regula-
tor? Following Gourmet, the answer to this question seems to be positive.
In Gourmet, the Court scrutinized a total ban on the advertisement of al-
coholic beverages on the grounds that it restricted “the right of press under-
takings established in the territory of that Member State to offer advertising
space in their publications to potential advertisers established in other Mem-
ber States.”34 The approach in Gourmet signals a considerable expansion in
the scope of Article 49 because, in this case, Gourmet was challenging the
very illegality of the provision of services in its Member State of establish-
ment. The fact that Gourmet could not provide its services to foreign recipi-
ents was a purely incidental factor and the specificity of the intra-Com-
munity situation was lacking. The situation was then different both from that
at issue in Schindler, and from that at issue in Alpine.
In Schindler35 the claimants, established in Germany, attacked the British
ban on the provision of lotteries on the grounds that it constituted a restric-
tion on their freedom to provide services. In other words, the foreign provid-
ers sought to provide a service in a Member State in which that service was
unlawful. The restriction amounted thus to a ban on service provision, and
the Court found it to be a restriction justified according to imperative re-
quirements of public interest. In Schindler, the provider sought to extend its
market to another Member State. However, it did lawfully provide the service
in its Member State of establishment (where it was regulated). In Gourmet,
the provider could not – in its Member State of establishment – lawfully pro-
vide the service.
The situation in Gourmet also differed markedly from that in Alpine. In
Alpine, the rules at issue directly restricted the possibility of advertisement
in another Member State. The situation was thus dynamic in nature, the rule
33. In the other cases in which Art. 49 was relied upon against the Member State of estab-
lishment the rules were either indirectly (Corsica Ferries, cited supra note 32) or directly dis-
criminatory (Erich Ciola, cited supra note 32) and directly affected the providers’ freedom to
provide the service. On the other hand in Peralta, cited supra note 32, the claimant could not
rely on Art. 49 against the Member State of establishment since the rule was neither discrimi-
natory nor protectionist.
34. Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. Gourmet International Products
AB (GIP), [2001] ECR I-1795, para 38.
35. Case C-275/92, HM Customs Excise v. Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039.
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was extra-territorial and the barrier to the possibility of “exporting” services
was direct. If Alpine was challenging a rule imposed by its Member State of
establishment, the rule prohibited something which, although unlawful in the
Member State of establishment, was lawful in the recipient’s Member State
where the service would be provided. On the other hand, in Gourmet, the
Swedish rule did not impede domestic producers or service providers from
advertising their goods/services abroad; nor did it affect the provider’s abil-
ity to provide a service in another Member State where the service was law-
ful.36 It merely affected the provider’s ability to provide the service in the
Member State of establishment.
The significance of the Sodemare/Gourmet approach is of practical as
well as theoretical importance. To allow a provider to challenge the rules im-
posed by its Member State of establishment on the sole ground that its re-
cipients might be foreign, means to dispose, not only of the home-State
control principle, but also of the requirement that the service be lawfully
supplied before the provider is allowed to rely on the Treaty. In both
Sodemare and Gourmet, the service was to be provided in the Member State
of establishment, and the rules did not have an extra-territorial effect. Fur-
thermore, in Gourmet, the service to be provided in the State of establish-
ment was a service which was there unlawful, and indeed it was the very
illegality of the service which was under attack. Gourmet was allowed to
challenge rules which did not have a specific cross border effect: those rules
did not prevent access to a foreign market, rather they prevented the very ex-
istence of a domestic market. Taken at face value, the Gourmet approach
would for instance allow a challenge of the unlawfulness of prostitution ser-
vices on the grounds that some of the clients might be foreign.37
The end result of the Gourmet approach (especially if seen together with
the Gebhard case law) is to subject the Member States’ ability to regulate op-
erators established in their territory to a general proportionality requirement.
The question is then whether the Gebhard/Gourmet developments, which
cannot be explained having regard to the double burden theory, can be ac-
commodated in the framework provided by those who support the market ac-
36. The situation was also different from that in Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v.
Confédération du Commerce Luxembourgeois Asbl, [1991] I-667, where the restriction on ad-
vertisement was imposed by the recipients’ Member State and directly affected the undertak-
ing’s ability to attract clients from that country.
37. The fact that rules prohibiting soliciting would probably be found to be justified on
public morality grounds does not affect this assessment: it is the subjection of the rules to a
proportionality assessment to be problematic in constitutional terms, i.e. the extent of applica-
tion of the free movement provisions and consequently of judicial review of national legisla-
tion under Community law.
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cess approach. And in any case, it should be queried whether this case law
can find sufficient normative basis in the Treaty free movement provisions.
We shall first analyse the market access test, to then turn our attention to the
questions of legitimacy.
4. Market access: A concept in search of a definition?
Several authors have argued that the free movement provisions should be
construed with reference to the market access test.38 And indeed there is in-
creasing case law to suggest that market access is central not only to the
scope of Article 49,39 but also to the workers (and probably the establish-
ment) provisions. Thus, the Court referred to market access in Bosman,40 and
in Graf excluded the applicability of Article 39 because the rules at issue did
not affect access to the labour market.41 It is then undeniable that the Court
considers a hindrance to market access as falling within the scope of the
Treaty free movement of persons provisions. As for goods, the reference to
market access in paragraph 17 of the Keck ruling,42 together with recent de-
velopments,43 seem to suggest that market access is also relevant to Article
38. See e.g. A.G. Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec, cited supra note 9. Cf. Weatherill, op. cit.;
Barnard, op. cit.; Poiares Maduro, op. cit.; all supra note 9.
39. This was openly stated in Alpine Investments, cited supra note 26.
40. Cited supra note 11, para 103.
41. Case C-190/98, V Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, [2000] ECR I-437, esp.
para 23. In Joined Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97, C Deliège v. Ligue Francophone de Judo et
Disciplines Associées ASBL et al., [2000] ECR I-2549 the Court relied on the fact that the rule
was neither discriminatory nor regulating the conditions to access to the market, to exclude the
applicability of Art. 49 to selection rules for participation in sporting competitions, subject to
the caveat that the rules be inherently necessary for the organization of such competitions.
42. Case C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097, para 17 “Provided that
those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another
Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to
prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of
domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 [now 28] of the
Treaty.” The Court’s reference to market access seems indicative that it considers market ac-
cess relevant. Thus, what the supporters of the market access test question is the absolute pre-
sumption that non-discriminatory selling arrangements do not affect market access. Arguing
the Keck test might be more flexible than it seems at first sight, Koutrakos, “On groceries,
alcohol and olive oil: More on the free movement of goods after Keck”, 26 EL Rev. (2001),
391.
43. The ruling in Gourmet, cited supra note 34, seemed to indicate that the Court’s readi-
ness to scrutinize barriers preventing market access even when non-discriminatory. However,
in Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV, judgment of 11
Dec. 2003, nyr, the Court retreats to a purely discriminatory assessment of the selling arrange-
Gebhard 757
28. Before starting our discussion on market access, however, we should at-
tempt to look at the different meanings which might be given to the notion of
a “barrier to market access”.
4.1. The economic view
In economics, there are, broadly speaking, two views of what constitutes a
barrier to market access.
At one extreme, a barrier to market access is understood as being a barrier
to entry, whether created by circumstances or by legislation.44 Barriers to en-
try are “barriers that make it more costly for new firms to enter an indus-
try”.45 In economic terms, therefore, a barrier to market access is defined
through a comparative assessment.46 Market access is thus construed as the
ability for an economic actor to gain access to a market on an equal footing
with other economic operators. This definition seems entirely consistent with
the Court’s view in Keck, but for the fact that the Court makes it clear that a
rule preventing market access (i.e. a total barrier) falls within the definition,
regardless of discrimination.47
At the other extreme, any regulation can be seen as a potential barrier to
access, since any regulation imposes and implies compliance costs. In order
to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable barriers to market access, regard
is paid to whether the measure is arbitrary or not, rather than on its disparate
effect. So, for instance, a ban on Sunday trading might not be considered ar-
bitrary, since it can be justified by the protection of workers or of cultural
and social traditions. On the other hand, a rule which restricted the sale of
newspapers to two hours a day could be seen as an arbitrary restriction on
market access. This approach is more similar to that followed by the Court in
the free movement of persons cases, and indeed the imperative requirements
ment at issue (a ban on internet sale of medicinal products). In Case C-337/95, Dior v. Evora,
[1997] ECR I-6013, the Court explicitely referred to market access (para 51).
44. Of course we are concerned only with obstacles to access raised by regulations, or indi-
vidual behaviour, not with “natural” obstacles (such as geographical conditions).
45. Foldovary, Dictionary of free market economics (Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, 1998),
48. See also Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2002) entry “market ac-
cess” which defines market access as the “freedom to sell in a market”, and identifies as institu-
tional obstacles restrictions on entry, tariffs and quotas.
46. A ban on advertisement is then considered a barrier to entry if, for instance, the prod-
ucts aims to compete with national established products since it would make it more difficult
for the imported product to penetrate the new market. On similar lines see the Court’s reason-
ing in Gourmet, cited supra note 34.
47. From an economic viewpoint, it is a matter of discussion whether a non-discriminatory
barrier which prevents market access is to be considered a barrier to entry.
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doctrine can be seen as a refined version of the “arbitrariness” test. The rule
is not arbitrary only if it pursues an interest consistent with Community law,
and if the restriction it imposes is necessary and proportionate.
The tension between these two meanings which can be given to the con-
cept of market access is reflected both in the case law of the Court (Keck vis-
à-vis the case law on persons), and in the scholarly debates, to which we
shall now turn our attention.
4.2. Market access and free movement: An intuitive approach?
In the context of Community law, those who support the market access test
seem to place themselves in between the extremes outlined above, adopting
an intuitive rather than an economic approach to market access. Thus, whilst
a purely discriminatory assessment is rejected, there is an attempt to provide
a test which would allow us to distinguish between rules which should be
subjected to judicial scrutiny, and rules considered neutral as regard intra-
Community trade which should fall altogether outside the scope of the
Treaty free movement provisions. However, there is no indication of pre-
cisely which rules should be considered as not constituting a barrier to mar-
ket access. Reliance on notions such as direct or substantial hindrance to
market access,48 do very little to provide a clear indication of what would
fall outside the scope of the free movement provisions.49 Further, this “intui-
tive” approach, also fails to identify why given rules do not affect market ac-
cess whilst others do.50
48. Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 9, esp. 896, proposes a test of direct or substantial hin-
drance to market access. A.G. Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec, cited supra note 9, suggested a test of
substantial hindrance to market access. A similar test has been suggested by Barnard, op. cit.
supra note; A.G. Lenz in Bosman, cited supra note 11, para 205, proposed a distinction be-
tween rules which regulate access to an occupational activity (which should be scrutinized),
and rules which regulate the exercise of that activity (which should not be scrutinized).
49. It is interesting to note that bans on advertisement and television sales, the two ex-
amples relied upon by A.G. Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec, cited supra note 9, to argue against the
Keck test and in favour of the market access test, would not necessarily fall without the scope of
Art. 28 even after Keck. A total ban on advertising might very well have a discriminatory
impact because, as the Court held in Gourmet, it might act to the detriment of imports, and A.G.
Jacobs himself concedes that this would be a likely result even in the post-Keck era. On the
other hand, the ban of television sales might be seen as a rule imposing a double burden, in that
imposing the rule of the country of destination in that case would mean that the person would
have to comply with two set of rules in relation to the same event.
50. On the lack of a precise definition of the notion of market access see also Craig and De
Burca, EU Law (OUP, 2002), p. 656. They suggest market access to be a means to an end, the
end being “to maximize sales/profits for the individual producer, and to enhance optimal allo-
cation of resources for the Community as a whole”.
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If, admittedly, this “intuitive” approach might still be useful in the case of
goods and services, where the situation is dynamic in nature and thus a bar-
rier to market access might very well result also in a barrier to movement,51
it clearly shows its definitional deficiency when used in the context of non-
discriminatory barriers to establishment and workers, where there might not
be any cross-border specificity to help us distinguish rules which should be
scrutinized from rules which should fall outside the scope of the Court’s
scrutiny. Thus if “in Keck and Leclerc-Siplec ... the limit of commercial free-
dom could not be directly connected to any cross-border aspect of the activ-
ity”,52 and thus the rules at issue did not directly or substantially hinder
market access, why was that not also the case in Gebhard?53 In Gebhard, the
rule under scrutiny was a rule which merely regulated the exercise of an eco-
nomic activity, providing that established lawyers should register at the local
bar in order to use the title avvocato. There was no limit to the exercise of
the economic activity which could be specifically connected to a cross-bor-
der aspect. For the purpose of the ruling, Mr Gebhard was not providing
cross-border services; he was providing services in Italy where he was estab-
lished. But in doing so, he was no different from any other person estab-
lished in Italy: there was no intra-Community specificity to his situation. If
the barrier could not be connected to any cross-border aspect of the activity,
then why was the rule scrutinized in the first place? Similarly, in Gourmet
the limit to commercial freedom was not directly connected to the cross-bor-
der aspect of the activity. Rather it was a natural consequence of the mere
existence of the domestic rules.
4.3. Advocate General Fennelly’s test: Formal restrictions to market access
In order to provide a definition of market access capable of explaining also
the scrutiny of non-discriminatory restrictions in the field of establishment,
whilst still allowing for some differentiation between non-discriminatory
rules which should or should not be caught by the Treaty, Advocate General
Fennelly has suggested the notion of formal restrictions on access to eco-
nomic activity in another Member State. These would be “(c)onditions ...
prescribed by law or regulation non-compliance with which constitutes an
absolute bar to taking up the activity in question”.54 The rules at issue in
51. On static and dynamic rules see Mortelmans, “Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and legisla-
tion relating to market circumstances: time to consider a new definition?” 28 CML Rev.
(1991), 115.
52. Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 9, at 905.
53. Cited supra note 11.
54. Graf, cited supra note 41, Opinion para 28.
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Gebhard undeniably had this effect since they constituted a necessary condi-
tion to lawfully exercise the legal profession. However, when an alleged ob-
stacle does not arise from a formal restriction to market access, but rather
“from some neutral material barrier or disincentive deriving from national
regulations, the prejudice to the exercise of Community-law rights must be
established”,55 i.e. some sort of disadvantage arising from the fact that a free
movement right has been exercised. In this way, the effect of the Gebhard
ruling could be curtailed so as to exclude some rules from the reach of the
Treaty.
However, the test proposed by Advocate General Fennelly, whilst provid-
ing an accurate description of the state of the law, does not provide us with
any explanation as to the reason why different types of rules are to be treated
in different ways. In other words: why does a prejudice to the right of free
movement need to be established only in some cases but not in others? One
possible explanation for this distinction is that Advocate General Fennelly
considers formal barriers to market access as inherently prejudicial to free
movement, and thus as being caught by Articles 43/39 and in need of justifi-
cation. However, neither the wording nor a purposive interpretation of the
Treaty seem to support this claim. Article 43 provides that freedom of estab-
lishment shall be exercised under the conditions laid down in the host State,
whilst Article 39 provides for the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality. Whilst the wording of both articles suggests that the right to
equal treatment is not the only right that employed and self-employed people
derive from the Treaty,56 it does suggest that, once in the territory of the host
State, individuals should abide by the laws of that State. The Treaty wording
seems thus not to support the notion of a formal barrier to market access.
The question is then whether a purposive interpretation of the Treaty justi-
fies such an approach; i.e. whether an internal market/movement rationale
provides an explanation for the formal barrier approach. There are three ar-
guments which could be put forward in order to defend the view that the in-
clusion of formal barriers to market access in the scope of Article 43 is
justified by a teleological reading of the Treaty.
First, the formal barrier test is reminiscent of the case law on absolute
bans on imports and provision of services. Thus, one could argue that since
absolute barriers to the import of goods and the provision of services are
caught by the Treaty even when non-discriminatory, that should be the case
also for the other free movement provisions. Analogical reasoning would
55. Graf, cited supra note 41, Opinion para 31.
56. Arts. 39 and 43 state that the freedoms shall include (or entail) the right to equal treat-
ment.
Gebhard 761
then lead to request Member States to justify rules such as those identified
by Advocate General Fennelly, since they also “bar” an economic activity.
However, the analogy would be misplaced. There are in fact two ways, by no
means mutually exclusive, to explain the case law on goods and services. A
total barrier to imports runs against the very prohibition on quantitative re-
strictions contained in the Treaty. This was the argument used by the Court in
Henn and Darby.57 Similarly, a prohibition on the provision of services
might be seen as an absolute restriction which, according to the wording of
the Treaty, would have to be justified.58 But also, and more importantly, both
a ban on imports and a ban on the provision of services run against the mu-
tual recognition principle.59 Once a product/service has been lawfully pro-
duced, i.e. has been regulated somewhere in the Community, it should be
able to freely move unless there is a good reason to stop it.60 However, if the
product has not been lawfully produced (such as heroin), then there is no is-
sue of free movement.61
In the case of established persons, the migrant is subject (for most pur-
poses) to just one set of regulations. Similarly, in cases where a service pro-
vider can rely on Article 49 only on the grounds that it provides a service for
recipients established abroad, even though there is no barrier to cross-border
activities, the economic actor is allowed to question its main (and maybe
57. Case 34/79, R v. Henn and Darby, [1979] ECR 3795. It is not clear whether the Court
still considers ban on imports as quantitative restrictions or rather as measures having equiva-
lent effect that can be justified also according to the mandatory requirements. See e.g. Case
216/84, Commission v. France (Milk substitutes), [1988] ECR 793; Case 76/86, Commission v.
Germany (Milk Substitutes), [1989] ECR 1021; Case 52/88, Commission v. Belgium (Ge-
latine), [1989] ECR 1137; and Case C-67/97, Bluhme, [1998] ECR I-8033, esp. para 19.
58. Schindler, cited supra note 35; the Court allows absolute bans to the provision of a
service to be justified also by the imperative requirements doctrine.
59. On mutual recognition see Armstrong, “Mutual Recognition” in Barnard and Scott
(Eds.), The Law of the Single European Market. Unpacking the premises (Hart, 2002), ch. 9.
60. This case law is entirely consistent with the internal market and the attempt to eradicate
any protectionist measures. Take the case of a Member State which produces only beer, and
bans marketing and imports of wine; judicial scrutiny of such measure would be entirely con-
sistent and necessary for the establishment of a true internal market.
61. To the author’s knowledge no case has arisen so far in relation to “illegal goods”, i.e.
goods which are illegal throughout the Community. The legal situation of drugs was consid-
ered in relation to taxation in Case 240/81, Senta Einberger v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg, [1982]
ECR 3699 and in Case 294/82, Senta Einberger v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg, [1984] ECR 1177.
The issue of whether a product not produced according to the rules of the country of origin
could nonetheless benefit from Art. 28 was left unanswered in Case 94/83, Criminal Proceed-
ings against A Heijn BV, [1984] ECR 3263. In this case A.G. Lenz submitted that the condition
that a product be lawfully produced in order to benefit of Art. 28 was not an essential require-
ment.
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only) regulator.62 It is then difficult to understand how the imposition of one
regulatory standard can automatically be considered as a hindrance to move-
ment without there being the need to prove a prejudice to the exercise of the
free movement rights. The idea that a formal bar to activities of established
persons should be subject to judicial scrutiny is, in this case, not justified by
a regulatory repartition/mutual recognition approach, or by a movement ra-
tionale.
Secondly, it might be that the relevant factor which brought about the
Court’s scrutiny in the cases on establishment, as examined above, is the un-
derpinning internal market assumption that, once a person is exercising a
profession somewhere in the Community, she should be allowed to exercise
that profession in other Member States unless there is a good reason to pre-
vent her.63 This could be the rationale behind Mac Quen and Payroll:64 in
both cases, the parent companies were lawfully providing the service in their
State of primary establishment, and wanted to extend their market to other
Member States. One could argue that the fact that they were doing so
through the establishment of subsidiaries should not affect their freedom to
elaborate a pan-European strategy and gain access to other markets. Thus,
there might have been an intra-Community specificity which justified the
Court’s scrutiny.
However, this was not the case in Gebhard and Gräbner.65 In those cases,
there was no attempt to elaborate a pan-European strategy; and indeed those
cases – surely the latter, probably the former – related to primary, rather than
secondary, establishment. Furthermore, in all four cases, the Court’s reason-
ing does not suggest that there is any assessment of the existence a specific
barrier to intra-Community movement. In order to fall within the scope of
the Treaty, a rule needs to satisfy a two-limb test: it has to hinder or discour-
age movement, and it has to be not justified. As in the case of goods in the
1980s, the Court is now focusing primarily on the second limb of the test,
i.e. on an assessment of the proportionality of the measures at stake. It is
only in a few cases that the first limb of the test is deemed not to have been
satisfied and thus there is no need to address the proportionality of the mea-
sures at stake.66 It is this focus on the proportionality assessment, rather than
62. See the discussion on Sodemare and Gourmet above.
63. I am particularly grateful to Michael Dougan for raising this objection.
64. Mac Quen, cited supra note 19; and Payroll, cited supra note 21.
65. Case C-294/00, Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfaharen GmbH v. K
Gräbner, [2002] I-6515.
66. E.g. in those in which the alleged limitation imposed has very little connection to the
exercise of the economic activity, such as Graf, cited supra note 41, or is inherent in the very
existence of the economic activity such as in Deliège, cited supra note 41.
Gebhard 763
on the existence of a barrier to intra-Community movement, that makes it
more difficult to find an intra-Community specificity of the rules under
scrutiny so as to provide some guidance as to the rationale behind their in-
clusion within the scope of Article 43. Similarly, in Gourmet – as said before
– the issue was not one of attempting to penetrate new markets, but rather to
“create” a domestic market.
Thirdly, it could be argued that the formal barrier to market access test is
justified by a “movement rationale”. The Treaty grants a right to move to ex-
ercise an economic activity. If the Member States impose conditions on the
exercise of economic activities, they are indirectly imposing a restriction on
the individual’s right to move, in that, given the hindrance to the exercise of
the economic activity (the very reason why the migrant would migrate), the
individual might be discouraged from moving and thus discouraged from ex-
ercising her right. This approach reflects very much the reasoning of the
Court in Bosman and Gebhard, and it might (in a rather artificial way) ac-
commodate the ruling in Gourmet. But if that is so, if rules regulating the
exercise of economic activities constitute indirect hindrances to movement,
then why (or on which basis) is there a distinction between those imposing a
formal barrier to access and those imposing just a material barrier to access?
After all, high levels of social contributions or of direct or corporate taxa-
tion67 might have a much more discouraging effect on individuals’ or compa-
nies’ desire to move between Member States. If the rules in Gebhard were
caught because they indirectly discouraged the exercise of an economic ac-
tivity in Italy, so too should tax and social security rules. If that is so, how-
ever, the market access test loses any ability to distinguish between rules
which should be scrutinized and rules which should be not. It would be just
as well to say that, as construed by the Court, the free movement of persons
provisions are capable of encompassing virtually any rule. To interpret such
regulations as a barrier (formal or substantive) to market access means that
we are embracing a broad notion of market access, whereby potentially any
rule relating to the exercise of an economic activity can be construed as a
barrier to market access.68 This is not to say, however, that all rules will be so
67. In Case C-451/99, Cura Anlagen GmbH, [2002] ECR I-3193, the Court found that an
indirect tax on vehicles was in breach of Art. 49 because not proportionate. A.G. Jacobs, on the
other hand, found a breach because the tax had a more burdensome effect on foreign car
leasers. This case however does not seem to signal the Court’s willingness to scrutinize the
level of taxation, but rather the way such taxation is calculated.
68. Barnard and Deakin, “Market Access and Regulatory Competition” in Barnard and
Scott, op. cit. supra note 59, ch. 8, have elaborated on A.G. Fennelly’s test proposing a distinc-
tion between formal and substantial barriers to market access. The former would catch only
quantitative restrictions type of rules, whilst the latter would catch almost any rule.
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construed. In its erratic way of proceeding, the Court does adopt different
tests in relation to different rules, not least for social security and tax rules,
and might well exclude some rules because of an a priori assessment of their
legitimacy.
The ambiguity surrounding the market access test does little to help the
quest for clarity which characterizes the debate over the free movement pro-
visions: the problem is that either a discriminatory approach is accepted,
similar to the Court’s approach in Keck; or potentially almost any regulation
might be seen as a restriction to market access. If the latter view is accepted,
the test loses the ability to distinguish coherently between rules which are
subject to a proportionality assessment and rules which need not be so as-
sessed. Even were we to accept this as an inevitable result, we should still
query whether the notion of market access is the test which is better apt to
unveil the consequences of the Court’s interpretation, or rather whether it is
an “internal market blanket” covering a state of affairs which is perceived as
deeply uncomfortable. The market access test might indeed attempt to con-
ceal the fact that the Court’s interpretation of the free movement provisions
might no longer be justified with regard to the internal market rationale
alone.
5. A right to exercise an economic activity free of disproportionate
   regulations: Towards a liberal European Constitution
In the previous section, I attempted to show how the market access test is ei-
ther unable to provide an explanation for the Gebhard/Gourmet case law; or
is so broadly construed as to fail to provide us with any demarcation line in
relation to the scope of the free movement provisions. The developments in
Gebhard/Gourmet represent not only a step towards a considerable expan-
sion of the scope of the free movement provisions, but also a qualitative leap
in the content of the free movement rights. Thus, if the Court’s interpretation
of the persons provisions beforehand was instrumental – or could be so ex-
plained and justified – to the achievement of the internal market, the move
towards a non-discriminatory assessment of the rules imposed by the main
(if not only) regulator adds a new dimension to the rights conferred upon the
individuals by the Community. It is now possible to attack rules – at least to
a certain extent – which merely regulate an economic activity, even though
there is no double burden nor cross-border issue.
It is the very lack of specificity of the intra-Community situation, specific-
ity which exists when there is a double burden or a cross-border issue, which
brings about the qualitative change. In other words, the internal market ratio-
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nale provides no justification by itself for allowing a challenge to rules
which bear no relation to the individual’s ability to move around the Commu-
nity.69 The “free movement” right is not construed anymore as a mere right
to move, but rather as a right to pursue an economic activity in another coun-
try or even, in the Gourmet type of situations, in one’s own country. The
Community right then becomes akin to the claim that, in national contempo-
rary liberal democracies, citizens have against their own State not to be un-
justly limited in their freedom, be this freedom economic or of another kind.
A new layer of protection to personal freedom is added, and the very claim
which traditionally pertains to the realm of national constitutional law, the
right not to be restrained without good reason, becomes a Community right,
albeit restricted mainly to the economic dimension.
To hide this behind the notion of market access therefore seems an at-
tempt to seek a consistency between the internal market rationale and the in-
terpretation given by the Court, which does not in fact exist. In other words,
to speak about barriers to market access in these cases might be misleading,
in that it covers the real significance of the Gebhard development. In
Gebhard, the Court leaves economic agnosticism to espouse a notion of lib-
eral market economy.70 However, this does not mean that the Court is em-
bracing a neo-liberal approach, i.e. hostile to any regulation, in the belief
that it is for the market to regulate itself. Rather, it is embracing a liberal ap-
proach, in the sense of protecting the individual from unnecessary regula-
tion.71 It is exactly this preference towards the individual rather than the
“market” that explains the case law where there is no issue of any barrier to
movement, or where the economic-right dimension is minimal if not alto-
gether inexistent. The fact that the Court’s interpretation is not endorsing a
neo-liberal approach to regulation is demonstrated by the fact that it uses a
“light touch” on proportionality when dealing with this type of restrictions,72
69. Cf. also Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco advertising),
[2000] ECR I-8419, in which the Court refused to accept that a mere difference in regulatory
standards between different Member States automatically constitutes a barrier to movement or
a distortion of competition capable of justifying the exercise of Community regulatory compe-
tence under Arts. 94 and 95 EC.
70. The expression is borrowed from Bernard, “Discrimination and Free Movement in EC
Law”, 45 ICLQ (1996), 81.
71. See Bernard, op. cit. supra note 3 (2002) esp. ch. 2 and his point that, were the Court to
have embraced a neo-liberal view of the Economic Constitution, it would have to be much
more heavy-handed in its review of Community legislation.
72. In all cases but Payroll (supra note 21), the Court found the measures to be justified. On
the different intensity of proportionality review in Community law cf. de Búrca, “The principle
of proportionality and its application in EC Law” 13 YEL (1993), 105.
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thus ensuring that the Member States retain some power to decide the regula-
tory threshold and to balance competing values.
5.1. The Court as a guarantor of the individual
I have argued that the Gebhard developments suggest that the Court is ready
to scrutinize national rules in terms of proportionality even in cases in which
there seems not to be any hindrance to movement. By so doing, the Court is
acting as a constitutional court willing to protect the individual from unnec-
essary or unjust regulation. If it is true that the Court has always been sensi-
tive to the needs of those who exercise their Treaty rights, in the last decade
we have also witnessed a more interventionist approach, together with a use
of the free movement provisions which is sometimes purely instrumental to
the achievement of the intended result. This is particularly visible in the case
law relating to immigration rules, and especially in Carpenter.73
Mrs Carpenter was a Philippine national who, having overstayed her entry
permit to the UK, married a British national. She then sought leave to remain
in the UK, which was denied. The UK authorities then threatened to make a
deportation order if she did not voluntarily leave the country. According to
UK immigration rules, she was to leave the UK and then seek, from abroad,
permission to enter as a spouse of a UK citizen. Her husband had an adver-
tising business and a “significant proportion” of his trade was with advertis-
ers established elsewhere in the Community. He thus travelled to other
Member States in order to pursue his business. Mrs Carpenter claimed that
her deportation would affect Mr Carpenter’s right to carry on his activity,
since he would have either to go and live with her in the Philippines or be
separated from his family. The UK Government and the Commission consid-
ered the situation to be purely internal, since Mr Carpenter had not exercised
his right of movement, and was thus covered neither by secondary legisla-
tion,74 nor by the Singh ruling.75 The Court found that Mr Carpenter was a
73. Case C-60/00, M Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002]
ECR I-6279; cf. also A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-386/02, J Baldinger v. Pensionsver-
sicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter, Opinion delivered 11 Dec. 2003, nyr, case still pending. The
A.G. seems much more interested in avoiding a “clear injustice”, than in establishing a link
between the rule at issue and Community law.
74. Council Directive 73/148, O.J. 1973, L 172/14, on the abolition of restrictions on move-
ment and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to estab-
lishment and the provision of services, did not apply since it does not discipline the right of
residence of family members of a service provider established in her State of origin.
75. Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal et Surinder Singh, ex parte
Secretary of State for Home Department, [1992] ECR I-4265 in which the Court held that the
situation of a national returning to her Member State of origin after having exercised her right
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service provider within the meaning of Community law, since he provided
services for recipients in other Member States. It then found that his separa-
tion from his wife would be “detrimental to their family life and, therefore,
to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental free-
dom. That freedom could not be fully effective if Mr Carpenter were to be
deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of origin to the
entry and residence of his spouse”.76
The ruling is puzzling and difficult to explain in relation to the free move-
ment provisions. Both statements, that Mr Carpenter was a service provider,
and that deportation is a disruption to family life, are indeed true. However it
is the link between the two which is missing. In other words, whilst it is ob-
vious that emotional distress affects one’s working abilities, it is not clear
how such distress can be construed as a barrier to one’s ability to provide ser-
vices across the Community. By reading the rest of the ruling, it is clear that
the Court’s worry lies not with Mr Carpenter’s ability to provide services, but
rather with the fact that the deportation order affected his right to respect for
family life as guaranteed by the European Convention of Fundamental
Rights. The fact that the Treaty was triggered allowed the Court to assess the
compatibility of the UK rules with the Convention. By severing the link be-
tween service provision and obstacle, the Court de facto ensures that the
individual’s fundamental rights are protected in the case at issue. These
rights, however, had nothing to do with a right to free movement. Rather, the
case underlines the Court’s self-perception as a guarantor that the individual
is protected from executive/legislative misbehaviour.
The same is true, at least to a certain extent, of the decision in Akrich.77 In
this case, a Moroccan national married a UK national when he was unlaw-
fully present in the UK. The couple then moved to Ireland, where Mr Akrich
had asked to be deported, with the sole intention of triggering the Treaty
(Mrs Akrich worked there). Upon returning to the UK, Mr Akrich argued
that he was covered by the Singh ruling and that thus he derived a right of
residence from his wife’s Community rights.78 The Court, in contrast with
what decided in MRAX,79 stated that the rights to residence that third country
to free movement is covered by Community law and therefore her spouse derives a right of
residence from Community law.
76. Carpenter, supra note 73, para 39, emphasis added.
77. Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. H Akrich, judgment of
23 Sept. 2003, nyr.
78. Singh, supra note 75.
79. Case C-459/99, Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL
(MRAX) v. Belgium, [2002] ECR I-6591, in which the Court accepted that Community law
could be use to rectify the illegal status of a third country national spouse of Community mi-
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nationals derive from their Community spouses are conditional upon the
third country national being lawfully resident in a Member State at the time
when he moves to another Member State where his spouse is migrating or
has migrated. This notwithstanding, the Court imposed an obligation upon
the Member States to respect the right to family life as guaranteed by Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights even in situations in which
the third country national, being unlawfully present in the Community terri-
tory, is not otherwise protected by Community law.80
As a result of the rulings in Carpenter and Akrich, the Member States see
significantly reduced the possibility to control illegal immigration through
“exemplary” and perhaps draconian measures. Rather, Member States have
to take into account – whenever there is a Community element, but even
where such link is less evident – the personal situation of the persons con-
cerned, both in assessing the applicability of the public policy derogation and
in balancing immigration policies with the individual’s fundamental rights.
Again, the feeling one gets in reading those rulings is that of a Court which
is willing to interfere in Member States regulatory policies in order to pro-
tect fundamental (this time non-economic) rights.
6. Free movement and citizenship: Two sides of the same coin?
So far I have argued that the recent case law on free movement of services
and establishment is difficult to explain having sole regard to the internal
market objective. Thus, the scrutiny of rules which do not bear any intra-
Community specificity, such as the rules in Gebhard, Gourmet and Carpen-
ter, is difficult to explain having regard to a movement rationale. Rather, this
case law seems directed at protecting the individual from disproportionate
regulations imposed by Member States regardless of an effect, even only po-
tential, on the exercise of intra-Community economic activities. But if, as ar-
gued in the course of this article, the internal market objective does not lend
sufficient legitimacy for such steps, where is legitimacy to be found? The an-
swer, in the writer’s opinion, might lie with the notion of Union citizenship.81
grant and even in the case where the marriage was subsequent to the migrant’s exercise of the
free movement right.
80. Cf. also Case C-71/02, H Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk, judgment
of 25 March 2004, nyr, where the Court proceeded to the assessment of the compatibility of the
rules at issue with fundamental rights despite having found that they constituted selling ar-
rangements falling outside the scope of Art. 28.
81. Starting with Case C-85/96, M Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691,
the Court progressively fleshed out the rights deriving from Article 18. See especially Case C-
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In Baumbast, the Court has made clear that the right to move and reside for
economically inactive people (i.e. those who are not covered by the eco-
nomic free movement provisions) is bestowed directly by Article 18 EC.82
Whilst the Court has recognized that those rights are subject to limitations
and conditions, not least those contained in the three residence directives,83 it
has also made clear that the Member States are bound by the general prin-
ciples of Community law (and especially by the principle of proportionality)
when limiting the Union citizen’s right to reside in their country.
The developments which have occurred in relation to Article 18 might
help providing a stronger normative basis for the expansion of the scope of
the free movement of persons provisions. Thus, if the rulings in Gebhard and
Gourmet suggest that the Treaty is now interpreted as granting a right to pur-
sue an economic activity unhindered by disproportionate rules, and if those
developments can hardly be conceptualized as being justified by a movement
rationale, then they might be seen in the context of the Baumbast ruling. The
(economic) mover is surely to be considered as falling within the scope of
the Treaty, and a Union citizen is to be protected as a citizen by the principle
of proportionality (and fundamental rights) at least for anything concerning
the limitations and conditions imposed by the Member States on the exercise
of her Community rights. It is possible that, the free movement of persons
provisions read together with the Union citizenship provisions, provide suffi-
cient normative basis to allow a challenge of the rules which merely regulate
the exercise of an economic activity in the territory of another Member
State. In other words, if the free movement provisions grant a right to exer-
cise an economic activity in another Member State, albeit subject to the
same rules to which nationals are subject, and citizenship grants a right to be
treated proportionally whenever the State is limiting the right to move
granted by Article 18, then it could be argued that the State has also to re-
spect the principle of proportionality when limiting the right, granted by the
Treaty, to exercise an economic activity in its territory. The provisions on
free movement of persons can then be read together with those on Union
184/99, R Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, [2001] ECR
I-6193; Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office national d’emploi, [2002] ECR I-6191; Case C-413/
99, Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for Home Department, [2002] ECR I-7091.
82. Case Baumbast, cited supra note 80; and see Dougan and Spaventa, “Educating Rudy
and the (non-)English Patient: A Double-Bill on Residency Rights under Article 18 EC” 28 EL
Rev. (2003), 699.
83. Council Directive 90/364, O.J. 1990, L 180/26, on the right of residence; Council Di-
rective 90/365, O.J. 1990, L 180/28, on the right of residence for employees and self-employed
persons who have ceased their occupational activity; Council Directive 93/96, O.J. 1993, L
317/59, on the right of residence for students.
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citizenship, to provide a more convincing explanation of the Court’s case
law.
As for the ruling in Carpenter, the case law on Union citizenship might
also in this case provide some basis to explain the Court’s approach. As said
above, the Court held in Baumbast that the limitations to which the right to
reside and move under Article 18 are subject, must be interpreted according
to the general principles of Community law. This suggests that the conditions
imposed on movement and residence are also subject to fundamental rights
as general principles of Community law. One of the issues which might soon
face the Court is the extent to which Union citizens are protected by the gen-
eral principles of Community law when moving.
If, on the one hand, the Court’s ruling in Carpenter suggests that the pos-
sibility of invoking fundamental rights as general principles of Community
law against national rules is still limited to situations in which the rule either
limits,84 or derogates from,85 the Treaty free movement rights, on the other
hand, the normative justification adopted in that case is highly unsatisfactory
– since it was achieved by the creation of an imaginary link between the
disputed national rule and a barrier to the intra-Community provision of ser-
vices. There are two possible ways in which the ruling could be accommo-
dated in a more coherent way in the current Treaty framework. It could be
argued that the general principles of Community law always apply, regard-
less of whether the situation is purely internal or not, i.e. not only regardless
of a connection between the rule and a barrier to movement, but even regard-
less of a connection with the exercise of a right to movement.86 The creation
of Union citizenship (in this case of Art. 17 rather than 18) would then have
the effect of establishing a general competence of fundamental rights review
for national and European courts. This would be a revolutionary route, and
one of debatable legitimacy. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent with
Opinion 2/94,87 where the Court excluded that the Community had compe-
tence to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. And it would
be inconsistent with the ruling in Konstantinidis where the Court refused to
follow Advocate General Jacobs’ suggestion that migrants should always be
protected by fundamental rights as general principles of Community law,88
84. Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v.
Heinrich Bauer Verlag, [1997] ECR I-3689.
85. Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v. Dimotiki Étairia
Pliroforissis (DEP), [1991] ECR I-2925; Carpenter, cited supra note 73.
86. See also N. Nic Shuibhne, “Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule:
Time to move on?”, 39 CML Rev.,731–771.
87. Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] ECR I-1759.
88. Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig, Standesamt und Landratsamt Calw,
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regardless of whether the rule which might interfere with the citizen’s right
directly relates to the exercise of her free movement rights.89 Such a route
would also be at odds with the horizontal provisions of the Charter which
make clear that the Charter – when and if it acquires a clear legal status – is
binding on the Member States only when they implement Union law.90 For
the time-being, it is unlikely that the Court would be prepared to interfere to
such an extent, and so intrusively, with choices which are under constant de-
bate at institutional level.
Otherwise, it could be argued that the combined effect of Article 17 and
12 is to grant protection, as a matter of Community rather than national
law,91 to citizens who have not exercised their free movement rights, and
who, by virtue of Article 12, cannot be discriminated against on grounds of
nationality.92 Thus, citizens in purely internal situations would be able
through the combined effect of Article 17 and 12 to enjoy rights equivalent
to those enjoyed by citizens who have exercised their Treaty rights, or who
come within the scope of secondary legislation. This interpretation would
also significantly expand the current scope of the Treaty, but less so than a
free-standing fundamental rights protection. It would, in any case, provide a
more convincing framework to accommodate the Carpenter ruling (and
maybe also the Gourmet approach).
7. Concluding remarks
I have attempted to demonstrate that the Gebhard/Gourmet case law consti-
tuted a qualitative leap in the interpretation of the free movement provisions.
Ordnungsamt, [1993] ECR I-1191; but then see Jacobs, “Human Rights in the European
Union: The Role of the Court of Justice”, 26 EL Rev. (2001), 331.
89. See generally Demetriou “Using Human Rights through European Community Law”, 5
EHLRR (1999), 484.
90. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. 2000, C 364/1, Art. 51. The
rights in the Charter will thus apply in a narrower way than fundamental rights as general
principles of Community law, since, as currently interpreted, general principles apply when-
ever a Member State is acting within the scope of Community law, rather than just when imple-
menting Union law.
91. Several national constitutions (e.g. Italian, Austrian, French, Belgian) provide for a
general right of equality which has been used to rectify the problem of reverse discrimination
arising in purely internal situations. Thus, through the medium of national constitutional law
some citizens already enjoy a protection equivalent to that afforded to those who are protected
by the Treaty free movement provisions.
92. Johnson and O’Keeffe, “From Discrimination to Obstacles to Free Movement: Recent
Developments Concerning the Free Movement of Workers 1989–1994”, 31 CML Rev. (1994),
1313, have advocated the introduction of a general principle of equality in Community law,
which would apply to Community and third country nationals alike.
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By allowing judicial scrutiny of non-discriminatory rules against the State of
establishment, the Court stepped beyond a movement rationale. Whilst the
discrimination/double burden approach cannot accommodate these develop-
ments, to rely on the notion of market access to justify such case law might
be misleading, since in order to do so a very wide interpretation of market
access has to be given, which consequently allows scrutiny of almost any
regulation. Thus, I preferred to describe the step taken by the Court as grant-
ing an individual right to exercise an economic activity free of disproportion-
ate regulation. I will accept the criticism that this definition is by no means
more precise than a broad market access test, in that it tells us very little
about which rules, if any, can be left outside the Court’s scrutiny. However,
the reason why I prefer to use the notion of a right to exercise an economic
activity is because it better describes what is going on, having regard to two
factors.
First of all, it draws attention to the fact that it is difficult to justify the
Court’s interpretation only having regard to the internal market rationale and
negative integration. Secondly, I want to underline the fact that this case law
is part of a broader phenomenon, which sees the Court expressing a strong
preference for protecting the individual from rules it perceives as unjust.
Thus, it is submitted that the two phenomena are linked and that we are wit-
nessing a change in the conception of the Community, which goes far be-
yond a system aimed at guaranteeing free movement of factors of production
and undistorted competition. In this regard, I have linked those developments
to the ruling in Carpenter, where the Court’s role as a protector of rights is
even more evident.93 In Carpenter, the link with the economic dimension is
minimal, if at all existent; thus neither the broad notion of market access nor
the notion of unhindered exercise of an economic activity provide any guid-
ance as to the rationale behind the case.
If the internal market rationale cannot by itself provide a satisfactory an-
swer for cases such as Gebhard, Gourmet and Carpenter, legitimacy for the
Court’s interpretation has to be sought somewhere else in the Treaty. Thus,
the effect of the free movement provisions is to impose a duty to refrain from
disproportionate interference with fundamental, economic and non-eco-
nomic, rights. In expanding the boundaries of the Treaty free movement of
persons provisions, so as to subject an increasing number of national rules to
the proportionality assessment demanded by the imperative requirements
doctrine, the Court is acting as a guarantor of individual rights vis-à-vis na-
93. Of course there are many areas of Community law where the Court seems less eager to
perform a role as a guarantor of individual rights; e.g. the Court’s refusal to relax the rules on
standing in Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, [2002] ECR I-6677.
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tional regulators. Taken together, those cases point at the emergence of a new
constitutional dimension whereby the Member States bear considerable du-
ties towards Union citizens qua citizens rather than just qua economic actors
– a duty not to interfere with individual rights (Gebhard) and a duty to re-
spect individual rights (Carpenter).94 It is for this reason that both the
Gebhard/Gourmet case law and Carpenter should be read in the context of
Union citizenship.
94. And, following the developments in the health cases, one could argue that the Member
States also have a duty to protect fundamental rights (on this issue see Spaventa “Public Ser-
vices and European Law: Looking for Boundaries” 5 CYELS (2002), 271). In the health cases
the Court relaxed its previous interpretation of the “remuneration” element necessary to trigger
Art. 49, to include within the scope of that provision also rules which impose conditions on
patients’ ability to seek health care abroad at the expenses of the competent (public or semi-
public) institution; see especially Case C-157/99, B S M Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds
VGZ and Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, [2001] ECR I-5473; and Case
C-368/98, A Vanbraekel et al. v. Alliance nationale des mutualités chrétiennes, [2001] ECR I-
5363; C-385/99, V G Müller-Fauré v. Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen U A and
E E M van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Z A O Zorgverzekeringen, [2003] ECR I-
4509. These cases have been extensively analysed by the scholarship; e.g. Davies, “Welfare as
a Service”, 29 LIEI (2002), 27; Hatzopoulos, “Killing the national health systems but healing
the patients? The European market for health care after the judgment of the ECJ in Vanbraekel
and Peerbooms”, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 683.
